ICASA's Findings and Draft Regulations

Oral hearing Vodacom presentation 12 August 2021

Overview

Regulatory uncertainty hampers investment. Vodacom therefore welcomes the conclusion of the market review. The market now needs the ITA to be completed and a period of certainty to enable investment

Vodacom is willing to accept some of ICASA's proposals (including the proposed remedies for site access). However, there are a number of areas which Vodacom cannot support

Competition

 ICASA fails to recognise competition between operators has intensified substantially – it is wrong to characterise MTN and Vodacom as a duopoly

((•))

- The market is characterised by both intense pricing and network competition
- Telkom is a also formidable competitor

Spectrum

- ICASA understates the impact of the spectrum auction and WOAN over the upcoming market review period
- Its analysis of the markets cannot be relied upon as it has failed to fully account for the impact of spectrum constraints on outcomes
- Telkom has significantly more spectrum in total and per customer

Remedies

- ICASA's monitoring obligations
 are unwarranted
- However, if ICASA does decide to persist with such obligations for roaming services, then it should monitor margins at an aggregated level across the portfolio of rated retail products (excl MBB/FWA)

Effectiveness of competition

The ICT market is constantly evolving, which renders past competitive strategies redundant and requires operators to constantly adjust. Some are better placed than others to do so.

"yesterday"	"tomorrow"
 Uniform customer needs and competition	 Diverse customer needs and competition revolves
revolved around delivery of voice and SMS	around delivery of data
 Voice coverage and availability the main driver of	 Data coverage, quality and speed the main driver
investment and differentiation	of investment and differentiation
 Limited sharing possibilities and operators	 Technical developments enable sharing at
focused mainly on own network deployment	various levels with huge benefits
 Microwave was adequate to meet backhaul and	 High speed fibre critical for transmission
backbone transmission requirements	requirements
 Licences were technology specific and # of	 Licences are technology neutral and the # of
market participants limited	market participants have tripled (2 -> 4 -> 6)

ICASA is wrong to focus on the combined position of Vodacom and MTN, as this ignores the significant head-to-head competition between the two players, in addition to the strong competition imposed by Telkom, Cell-C and Rain

Network

- There is intense competition on network quality
- Over the past financial year, Vodacom has spent over R10bn on its network in an attempt to keep pace with MTN





- Vodacom and MTN compete strongly for wholesale contracts, as demonstrated by Telkom and Cell-C switching their roaming contracts between Vodacom and MTN
- Vodacom and MTN have also been competing on MVNO and APN contracts

Effective competition delivered good retail market outcomes


Vodacom faces strong competition from a range of operators, including MTN

There is strong head-to-head competition on network quality







Spectrum efficiency (Hz / Customer)



Network NPS



There is strong head-to-head competition in the wholesale market



Telkom is well placed to continue growing

given its strong position on 4G data services

There are a number of factors that make Telkom a significant competitive force



Towers

- One of the largest tower
 owners
- More than 6200 towers
- More than **2000** additional sites in permitting phase



Spectrum

- Highest overall share of spectrum
- More than double the amount of spectrum used for 4G relative to Vodacom
- Seven times more spectrum per customer than Vodacom



Fibre backhaul

- More than 163,800km fibre
- More than **80%** of its radio sites connected by fibre
- Has not provided access to its dark fibre which explains why Vodacom only has 48% of its sites connected with fibre
- This puts Telkom in a **better position to expand capacity** and address increasing demand



Ducts & poles

- Controls most of SA's duct and pole network
- In a better position to further self-supply fibre backhaul in future
- Has not provided access to ducts and poles which explains why rivals will also be slower at deploying fibre backhaul in future




Options

- A number of options to determine optimal business model for offering services in a given area
- **Option** to roll-out own network using **combination** of own extensive towers; standard and deep passive sharing
- **Option** to use NR in areas where it does not have own network coverage
- Option to roll-out own network in a more targeted way – guided by site traffic density observed via NR

Telkom continues to grow at a fast rate and is also gaining customers from Vodacom and MTN


Telkom's growth demonstrates that there are limited barriers to expansion

Source: Telkom SA SOC Ltd Annual Results Presentation For the year ended 31 March 2021




58% of Telkom's net data subscriber additions came from Vodacom and 37% from MTN

Telkom



Report prepared by Africa Analysis February 2021



Cell-C

- Has implemented a business turnaround strategy
- Intends to bid in the spectrum auction, as per its ITA application
- Has decided to focus more on profitable subscribers rather than the size of its customer base
- There are signs that its profitability has improved considerably, with its EBITDA increasing by 27% and its EBIT increasing by 134% between H1 2020 and H2 2020


Rain

- Continues to grow its subscriber base at a rapid pace
- Price very aggressively
- Has used its agreements with Vodacom, as a springboard for developing its retail presence
- Intends to bid in the spectrum auction, as per its ITA application. Has ambitions to keep expanding and to become a credible national operator, with at least 80% own network population coverage


NEWS

Rain targets 2 000 5G towers as valuation hits R17.1-billion







Now 10GB @ R99 (5Gb anytime + 5Gb night time)



Now further increased data and voice allocations which translates to direct value for customers



Effective competition deliver good retail market outcomes




Spectrum

licences

ICASA position **Vodacom position** By March 2025, Obligations are important, but ignores other important impacts Main impact of auction will substantial Will result in a large boost to network capacity be driven by obligations • Will allow operators to improve coverage – potentially further and faster than attached to the spectrum coverage obligations increase in 2600MHz sites Significant support to smaller operators increase in 3500MHz sites Formidable impact will be realised during market review period The auction will ultimately In its parallel ITA process, ICASA itself highlighted the short-term impact have a formidable impact. reduction in congested sites High frequency spectrum will be available immediately but not over the upcoming · Low frequency spectrum will be partially available in the short-term market review period WOAN will have an impact Increase in capacity Increase in speed The auction will **only have** an impact on the MVNO / The spectrum auction will impact all of the mobile markets APN and site access Increase in coverage defined by ICASA markets over the upcoming market review period

Formidable impact will be realised during the market review period across all mobile markets

ICASA's market analysis is contaminated as it failed to account for impact of spectrum constraints



The spectrum constraints faced by S.A. MNOs are far more severe, and more longstanding than in other markets. Faced with this degree of constraint, it should be clear that not only will the award of this spectrum have a formidable impact on competition and market outcomes in the defined markets, but also that the failure to award this spectrum to date has also had a significantly detrimental impact on the market. This must be recognised.

ICASA's proposed remedies

... it would have been right to reject calls for intrusive regulatory remedies

1 There should be no remedies at the retail level	2 ICASA is right not to impose price controls	3 Accounting separation would be overly burdensome	4 No grounds for reference offers or non-accounting forms of separation
 Retail remedies should be a last resort if wholesale intervention is insufficient This is not the case here Direct intervention in retail markets would reduce innovation and stifle competition 	 Would be disproportionate and not backed by evidence (e.g., roaming prices have declined without intervention) Very little precedent in mobile Could have a significant negative impact on investment 	 Time consuming to develop Impractical to deliver at the level of markets defined by ICASA Limited precedent in mobile 	 Disproportionate interventions, not justified by market failures Reference Offers could stifle innovations in wholesale markets Limited precedent in mobile

"

"margin squeeze' occurs when the margin between the price at which a vertically integrated firm, which is **dominant in an** input market, sells a downstream product, and the price at which it sells the key input to competitors, is too small to allow downstream competitors to participate effectively" South African Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018



- ICASA has itself concluded that no operator has SMP for MVNO and APN services.
- ICASA is wrong to conclude that there is ineffective competition / SMP for national roaming services for coverage. Telkom has itself argued that national roaming deals have become more attractive.
- The purpose of ICASA collecting data on margins is to monitor for potential margin squeeze. But if margin squeeze cannot be a concern given the lack of ineffective competition/SMP, then ICASA has no justification for screening margins in the first place.

... it should monitor margins at an aggregated level across MNO's portfolio of rated retail products, including data, voice and messaging

because



- Consistent with MNO's business models
- ICASA did not find any concerns specific to any market segments
- Gives MNOs flexibility in how they recover common costs

- Granular tests could result in very low wholesale prices, which could undermine viability of the WOAN and/or deter investment
- Granular tests could make it more difficult to offer propoor pricing



 Competition authorities typically carry out margin squeeze tests at an aggregated level

If ICASA persists with monitoring roaming then FWA/MBB should be excluded

FWA/MBB used to fill gaps in fixed-wired broadband coverage

- S.A. has low fixed-wired (DSL, fibre) broadband coverage
- · FWA/MBB is often used to fill in gaps in fixed-wired products
- FWA and MBB products have similar characteristics e.g. primarily used while stationary, have large data allowances, rely on a router or dongle, exclude voice services
- Vodacom's "MBB" product compete with Telkom's FWA offer

Free services should also be excluded

Free services serve a number of important purposes

- Many free services relate to content that has a social benefit e.g. education, health, employment
- Some free services are related to the COVID-19 pandemic
- Free services help to make mobile usage more affordable for poorer consumers

Access seekers do not tend to use NR for FWA/MBB

- Given that mobility is less important for FWA/MBB services, access seekers typically don't use national roaming for FWA/MBB
- For many of Telkom's FWA products, it explicitly prohibits users from accessing national roaming services

There is a strong case for excluding free services

- Including free services in margin screen could result in MNOs i) withdrawing free services and/or ii) increasing retail prices
- COVID-19 related traffic is temporary
- MNOs have a legal requirement to provide certain free services

... take into account that access seekers primarily rely on their own network



Operators, such as Telkom, only use national roaming for a very small percentage of their overall traffic. For the majority of their traffic they rely on their own network

Cherry-pick


Where operators do rely on national roaming, they will have a strong incentive to cherry-pick i.e. use national roaming in areas with high costs So it would be misleading to draw any conclusions regarding margins based on a comparison of retail prices with national roaming prices. Instead, retail prices should be compared with a weighted average of own network costs (for an equally efficient operator) and national roaming costs.

Weighted average

When estimating the degree of cherry-picking, ...

• ICASA should only include traffic that relates to remote areas where it would be unviable for the access seeker to roll-out own network.

• This would be consistent with ICASA's objective to promote infrastructure-based competition, as reflected by its ITA rules



If ICASA persists with monitoring roaming then ...

Regulation	Vodacom position
7.1.2 – Wholesale prices	 ICASA should: Specify this is for roaming for coverage Include voice, SMS and data prices Specify time period over which prices are collected
7.1.3 – Roaming volumes by site	This information should only be provided if and when the SMP operator was required to justify a retail price above a wholesale price
7.1.4 – Retail prices	Include voice, SMS and data prices
7.1.7 – Justification	Should be required only if another party has made a formal complaint
7.2 – Referral	Clarify circumstances in which ICASA will refer to the CC

Vodacom would oppose

There is already effective competition for sites, notwithstanding existing regulations

3

Unused rooftops, micro sites, billboards and lampposts should also be included in the product market definition

2

- ICASA's market share analysis is not transparent
- It looks incorrect based on Vodacom's internal estimates, but it's difficult to know exactly why ICASA's results are different given the lack of transparency

4

- ICASA has understated the role of TowerCos
- And given that ICASA can only impose remedies on licensees, there is a risk of creating an uneven playing field if more intrusive remedies are imposed

5

Whilst Vodacom disagrees with ICASA's analysis of the market for site access, it is willing to accept ICASA's proposed remedies for sites, as long as ICASA takes into account the impact of such remedies on downstream markets



Vodacom agrees with some areas of ICASA's proposals

- No intervention in retail market
- No direct price regulation of wholesale markets

However, ICASA should reconsider a number of its proposals

- The justification for remedies is weak given that:
 - ✓ Competition is effective and has intensified
 - ✓ Spectrum auction will have a formidable impact over the market review period
- If ICASA decides to persist with monitoring of margins for roaming services, then this should be carried out at an aggregated level across MNOs portfolio of rated retail products (excluding FWA/MBB)



Q&A

Please type your questions on the webcast portal

